Ekrem Imamoğlu is the elected mayor of Istanbul and the presidential candidate for Turkey’s Republican People’s Party. He has been held in pretrial detention since March 2025.
I am writing these lines from a prison cell in Silivri.
My imprisonment isn’t merely a personal legal matter. It reflects a deeper rupture in Turkey’s democracy, its commitment to the rule of law, and its relationship with the EU.
For years, relations between Turkey and the EU have lacked honesty and balance. Officially ongoing since 1999, Turkey’s candidacy has grown largely hollow. The accession process survives on paper but has long been stalled politically. And while the Turkish government still claims full EU membership as a strategic objective, it simultaneously undermines the very basis of that relationship by weakening democratic politics and institutions, and eroding the rule of law and fundamental rights at home.
Two recent developments have brought this contradiction back into sharp focus. First, the latest draft of the European Parliament’s Turkey report, now heading to the plenary. Second, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s decision to place Turkey in the same category as Russia and China, framing it not as a partner but as an opposing actor.
At first glance, these may look like separate issues, but they point to the same underlying problem: the absence of a credible and shared commitment to a common future.
The EU still wavers between principle and vested interests in its dealings with Turkey, unable to articulate a strategic vision. Turkey, meanwhile, has failed to generate the democratic confidence needed to sustain any credible claim to a shared trajectory.
The European Parliament’s latest report goes beyond simply repeating the familiar concerns regarding Turkey’s democratic backsliding. It sets out what has happened in the period since my detention on March 19 far more concretely and explicitly: mounting pressure on the opposition and the intensifying erosion of democratic institutions.
It also makes clear that, at a time when EU enlargement policy is regaining momentum, Turkey is missing this “window of opportunity” because it has failed to deliver the required reforms.
This is no longer just about a frozen accession file. It is about strategic direction, and whether the EU and Turkey can still imagine a meaningful future together.
It is also where the deadlock in relations becomes most visible. As pressure on the country’s opposition hardens into a durable method of government, the issue moves well beyond the narrow confines of foreign policy and fundamentally becomes a question of regime. That is why so much of Turkey’s tensions with the EU are driven by the external consequences of its internal democratic decay.
As a founding member of the Council of Europe, from the very beginning Turkey has been part of Europe’s institutional order, built on democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Through its place in NATO, it constitutes an important part of Europe’s security architecture and collective defense. From the Black Sea to critical energy routes, from migration to industrial production, the EU’s long-term resilience cannot be bolstered by excluding Turkey.
This is why placing Turkey on the same plane as Russia and China runs contrary to the EU’s own geopolitical realities and strategic interests. Unlike these other actors, Turkey has a long-standing institutional relationship with Europe and a direct, structured partnership with the bloc. An EU that sidelines Turkey would ultimately weaken its own long-term security and economic resilience.
When the EU looks at Turkey today, the picture it sees is all too familiar: weakened institutions, a politicized judiciary and an opposition under pressure. But we do not simply describe this reality — we live it. What has distanced Turkey from the EU is not geography but the cumulative damage caused by authoritarian drift.
A government that has steadily moved the country away from Council of Europe standards, impaired the rule of law, defied judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, and steadily eroded local democracy cannot now credibly present itself as the guardian of European values.
That argument carries little weight in Brussels, and even less at home.
What Turkey needs now is not grandstanding but a clear direction. To defend a common future with the EU is not to seek its approval — nor does recognizing Europe’s double standards mean abandoning the European project. What we need is a political vision that views law, liberty and pluralism as inalienable rights belonging to the Turkish people rather than as external demands.
That is why the Turkey we seek to govern will be different. A Turkey that builds its relationship with the EU not on a passive wait for admittance but on equality, values and mutual interests; a Turkey that does not fear rights and freedoms but sees them as the foundation of its social order; a Turkey that treats law not as a bargaining chip but as the cornerstone of public life.
What we ask of the EU is simple: to move beyond viewing Turkey through the lens of fear, cliché and short-term political calculations, and begin engaging with its history, social realities and the institutional ties it has built with Europe more seriously.
I may be writing these words from a prison cell. But even here, my belief that Turkey’s path must lead toward democracy, rule of law, human rights and a common future with Europe has not wavered.
It should not be left waiting at the EU’s gates.
